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The paper analyzes migration from Zambia in order to understand how migration policy can 
support development in the least developed countries. Overall emigration from Zambia is not 
high by regional standards but the pattern of migration is skewed towards the skilled and away 
from the unskilled. A development-friendly approach to migration for Zambia would strive to 
ensure the temporariness of both types of movement.  First, industrial countries may be willing to 
accept a higher level of unskilled immigration if they could be certain that it was temporary.  
Second, any adverse effects of brain drain would be greatly alleviated if skilled emigration was 
temporary.  The problem is that host countries cannot unilaterally ensure temporariness of 
unskilled migration because repatriation cannot be accomplished without the help of source 
countries like Zambia, and source countries today have little incentive to facilitate the return of 
the unskilled.  At the same time, source countries like Zambia cannot unilaterally ensure 
temporariness of the skilled because repatriation cannot be accomplished without the help of the 
host countries, and host countries currently have little incentive to send back the skilled.  Hence, 
there is a strong case and considerable scope for cooperation between source countries like 
Zambia and destination countries in the design and implementation of migration policy so that 
unskilled migration becomes feasible and skilled migration takes a more desirable form. 
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Overall emigration from Zambia is not high by regional standards but the pattern 
of migration in Zambia is skewed towards the skilled.  Even though international 
migration offers potentially large benefits to sending and receiving countries, industrial 
receiving countries have shown little interest in liberalizing the inward flow of the 
unskilled while being relatively open to the entry of the skilled.  The total stock of 
Zambians living in the OECD countries is estimated at 27 per 10,000 of Zambia’s 
population, an emigration rate far below that of many other African countries, such as 
Kenya (56) and Zimbabwe (47).  Currently, about 10% of all tertiary educated Zambians 
live outside Zambia as compared to over 18% for Eastern Africa. The emigration rate 
amongst the tertiary educated is about 35 times that for the secondary educated in 
Zambia, while for most other African countries the ratio is below 10. The main reason for 
this is the low level of unskilled migration from Zambia.  
 
A development friendly migration policy for Zambia would strive to ensure 
temporariness.  On the one hand, industrial countries may be willing to accept a higher 
level of unskilled immigration if they could be certain that it was temporary.  On the 
other hand, concerns about brain drain in a source country like Zambia would be greatly 
alleviated if emigration was temporary.  The problem is that host countries cannot 
unilaterally ensure temporariness of unskilled migration because repatriation cannot be 
accomplished without the cooperation of the source.  And source countries cannot 
unilaterally ensure temporariness of the skilled because repatriation cannot be 
accomplished without the cooperation of the host.  Hence, there is a strong case for 
Zambia to cooperate with destination countries in the design and implementation of 
migration policy so that unskilled migration becomes feasible and skilled migration more 
desirable. 
 
Zambia may be able to promote more migration of the unskilled if it takes 
measures, in cooperation with the receiving countries, to ensure that such migration 
is temporary. Bilateral agreements on these lines have been successfully implemented 
between the Caribbean and Canada, Ecuador and Spain and Poland and Germany.   
Zambia would agree to help with the selection and screening of migrants, provide 
necessary pre-departure training and cooperate to ensure timely return.  Aversion to 
unskilled immigration in the receiving countries may be reduced through agreements that 
ensure temporariness. 
 
Although the rate of skilled migration is not high in Zambia, the impact is 
significant given the country’s limited capacity to generate human capital. The 
adverse effects of brain drain are typically larger when the country has limited human 
capital and limited capacity to train professionals. Both these concerns are valid for 
Zambia especially in the healthcare sector. For example, there are only 12 physicians per   3
100,000 of population in the country, which is lower than the least developed country 
average of 18 per 100,000.  New health graduates in Zambia number only 7 per 100,000 
population which is 8th lowest in Africa and the World. In terms of the stock of tertiary 
educated in all disciplines, Zambia’s performance is average by regional standards. It 
ranks 17th among 29 African countries and 5th among 10 SADC countries. 
 
The current skill shortage in Zambia is primarily due to inadequate educational 
infrastructure and cannot be solved merely by restricting skilled emigration. 
Government expenditure on education is currently only 2% of GDP, the lowest in Africa 
and well below the 3.4% average level for least developed countries. The problem of low 
expenditure is compounded by the way it is allocated. Students in health and welfare 
constitute about 3% of all students at the tertiary level in Zambia - only 7 countries in the 
world have a lower percentage. Restricting the outflow of the skilled will help address the 
existing shortages in Zambia only to a limited extent. For example, it is estimated that 
about 300 Zambian doctors practice abroad while the estimated shortage to meet the 
basic WHO recommended standards stands at 1654 doctors. 
 
Zambia has taken steps towards retention and voluntary return of those settled 
abroad but these schemes have had only limited success. The recent National 
Employment and Labor Market Policy (NELMP) specifically addresses emigration and 
seeks to attract skilled Zambians home by facilitating their return and reintegration and 
providing better working conditions. The country also launched a “bonding” system 
which requires all Zambians who are awarded a publicly funded scholarship to sign an 
agreement to return after the completion of their studies. Complementary schemes 
include the IOM’s Return of Qualified Africans (RQAN) and efforts by Migration for 
Development in Africa (MIDA).  These schemes have had limited success because they 
require those already settled abroad to return and those who could go abroad to stay in 
return for certain economic and moral incentives.  However, the strong economic motives 
which propel much of skilled emigration from Zambia tend to dominate the material and 
moral incentives to return. These problems apply also to exchange programs of the kind 
negotiated between the U.K. and South Africa. One alternative is to make receiving 
countries pay Zambia for the Zambian professionals they recruit. 
 
Similarly, compensation by host countries like the UK for Zambian skilled 
immigrants has proved difficult to negotiate and assistance to build training 
capacity may be a more feasible solution. Private firms in the receiving countries are 
often the main beneficiaries of skilled immigration, especially when public healthcare 
systems (like the NHS in the United Kingdom) exercise restraint in recruitment. A 
compensation scheme is then a de facto transfer from taxpayers in the receiving country 
to these firms, which may not be politically feasible. There are also problems with 
identifying the right level of compensation especially due to the large positive 
externalities arising from the presence of skilled professionals. A better strategy would be 
for host countries to provide aid to enhance training capacity in Zambia which need not 
be linked to the numbers emigrating. However, aid for training will need to be 
complemented by a for a more development friendly migration regime.  
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The adverse effects on Zambia of brain drain could be alleviated if skilled migration 
were temporary rather than permanent. Migration offers an opportunity to earn higher 
income and learn new skills in the host countries. Savings from higher income are a 
potential source of investment in Zambia while the skills acquired abroad are a substitute 
for costly training at home. But permanent migrants have less incentive to remit earnings 
while temporary migrants bring their savings home on return. Similarly, compared to 
permanent migration, temporary migration offers a larger number of individuals the 
opportunity to learn while abroad and transfer knowledge and skills to others in Zambia 
on their return. This circulation enhances the global stock of human capital and the 
benefits can be appropriately shared by the sending and receiving countries. These 
benefits of temporary over permanent migration are lost under other schemes which are 
based on permanent migration or no-migration. 
 
But temporary migration of the skilled cannot be achieved unilaterally by Zambia 
and requires cooperation with destination countries in the framework of a bilateral 
agreement. Today most temporary migration schemes in the OECD countries are in fact 
stepping stones to permanent migration.  The exceptions are certain managed migration 
schemes, such as the agreement between Poland and the Netherlands on the temporary 
movement of nurses and the Seasonal Agricultural Worker’s Scheme implemented by the 
U.K. for temporary visits by university students in agriculture. A commitment to 
repatriate by the host, e.g. through granting non-extendable visas, can be based either on 
self-interest or generosity.  In some cases, receiving countries find it difficult to 
implement temporariness of the skilled even when it is the socially preferred outcome. 
Firms and natives of the receiving countries often invest in the migrants through, for 
example, costly training or relationships. Once such investments are made they are in the 
nature of sunk costs and the continued presence of the migrant is required to reap the 
benefits of the investments. The government of the receiving country is then forced to 
grant such migrants permanent residence although ideally it prefers no-investment and 
temporary migration only. In these cases sending countries such as Zambia can help 
ensure temporariness through a bilateral treaty clearly ruling out permanent residence. In 
other cases, the receiving countries prefer permanent over temporary migration 
irrespective of the nature of relationship-specific investments. These cases relate to the 
highly skilled professions involving long and extensive training periods. Ensuring 
temporariness here is more difficult and Zambia must rely on the goodwill of the 
receiving countries to repatriate its brains. 
 
Facilitating the temporary movement of both the skilled and unskilled is 
accomplished more easily in a bilateral than regional or multilateral context.  
Existing international agreements on labor mobility, such as the WTO's General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, have failed to do better because they seek primarily to 
induce host countries to make commitments to allow entry.  Such an approach is 
currently ill-suited to unskilled migration because there is no provision for source 
countries like Zambia undertaking binding commitments on screening, selection and 
facilitating repatriation.  The approach is also ill-suited for skilled migration because it 
does not enable host countries to undertake binding commitments to ensure 
temporariness of skilled personnel from countries like Zambia.  In the absence of a   5
dramatic change in the multilateral framework, a development-friendly approach to 
manage migration is more easily developed in a bilateral context.     6
 
Migration in Zambia  
 
 
Migration pressure in Zambia 
 
International migration is fuelled by economic and socio-political factors typically 
classified as push and pull factors. The push factors include: poor socio-economic living 
conditions, unemployment, drops in real income, currency devaluation and rising cost of 
living, professional isolation, tribal/ethnic discrimination against the qualifications held 
and competition with expatriates. The pull factors include higher salaries, greater job 
mobility and professional career; fewer bureaucratic controls, higher standards of living; 
acquisition of higher skills, foreign scholarships and educational support, active presence 
of recruitment agents and network effects. These factors work in tandem with each other 
in generating migratory flows. In a formal empirical study, Hatton and Williamson 
(2001) analyze the push-pull factors for the sub-Saharan African countries and find that 
the real wage gaps between sending and receiving countries and the demographic booms 
in the low-wage sending regions are the two most important factors in driving migration. 
The study also notes that the situation in the region is similar to the one in Europe in the 
late 19
th century which fuelled mass migration.  
Emigration from Zambia is mostly driven by the economic motives mentioned 
above with little role of civil unrest, security concerns, etc., as the country has enjoyed 
peace and stability since its independence. Fears of mass emigration from Zambia (and 
continental Africa) to the rich developed countries seem unfounded at least for the 
present. In fact, African countries show lower levels of labor mobility than others. Table 
1 illustrates the point. 
 
 
Table 1: Migrants per 10,000 of source country population in 2000 
 
  OECD USA Canada UK  France  Switzerland  Netherlands 
Angola 87.3  1.7  1.1  2.5  4.6  2.7  2.0 
Botswana 15.8  5.9  0.2 6.0  0.7  0.1  0.4 
Congo, DR  18.0  0.9  1.1  1.1  3.3  0.6  0.7 
Lesotho 3.3  0.5  0.3  1.3  0.1  0.4  0.2 
Malawi 11.0  1.1  0.3  8.9  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Mozambique 33.7  0.8  0.5  1.5  0.4  0.4  0.2 
Namibia 10.6  0.5  0.9  3.9  0.4 0.7  0.4 
South Africa  61.1  11.1  6.2  20.5  0.3  0.9  1.2 
Swaziland 18.0 9.4  0.7 4.9  0.0  0.4  0.3 
Tanzania 18.1  2.7 5.2  8.5  0.1 0.2  0.2 
Zambia 26.5  4.3  1.4  16.1  0.1  0.2  0.3 
Zimbabwe 47.1 6.5  2.2 27.1  0.2  0.4  0.4 
All SADC  35.2  4.1  2.9  9.7  1.3  0.7  0.7 
Africa 55.9  8.0  2.8  7.7  17.8  0.8 2.9 
World 94.0  40.0  7.7  5.8  6.2  2.3 2.1 
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2004). 
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  The table shows that the emigration rate from Zambia is lower than the African 
average but comparable to the average in Southern Africa. A case study of Zambia may, 
therefore, help understand migration issues in Southern Africa and our findings may also 
be relevant to other parts of the world.
1 
  It is well known that overall migration rates do not convey the full picture of the 
possible impact of migration and the structure of migration is critical. The first element 
of the structure is the composition of migrants by their skill or the level of education. 




The table shows that tertiary educated Zambians living abroad equal 10% of all 
tertiary educated Zambians in the country and abroad. This rate is not too high when 
compared to other African countries although it is higher than many countries outside the 
African continent. For comparison, the corresponding rate stood at 6.2% (Northern 
Africa), 13.3% (Central Africa), 26.7% (Western Africa), 18.4% (Eastern Africa) and 
5.3% (Southern Africa). For the South-Central Asia region, it equaled 5.1% and 4.3% for 




                                                 
1 The argument holds when we look at the unskilled and skilled emigration rates separately. For skilled 
workers, Zambia’s emigration rate is comparable to those of Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, South Africa, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Congo (D.R). For unskilled workers, Namibia, Tanzania, Congo (D.R), Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar show roughly similar rates of emigration as Zambia.  
  Table2: Emigration rates by education in 2000 for SADC countries: 
           Migrants as % of all educated (natives plus migrants) in each category 





Angola 2.10  3.40  25.60 
Botswana 0.10  0.80  2.10 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.10  0.50  7.90 
Lesotho 0.00  0.10  2.4 
Malawi 0.00  0.80  9.40 
Mozambique 0.50  5.80  42.00 
Namibia 0.10  0.20  3.40 
South Africa  0.40  0.50  5.40 
Swaziland 0.20  0.20  5.80 
Tanzania 0.10  1.00  15.80 
Zambia 0.10  0.30  10.00 
Zimbabwe 0.20  0.70  7.60 





With most of the attention focused on skilled migration, migration of the 
unskilled (and the semi-skilled) has been largely neglected. However, as Winters et.al 
(2002) point out, welfare gains at the global level are likely to be larger from liberalizing 
this form of migration relative to the high-skilled. However, migration of the unskilled is 
one area where Zambia has lacked behind most of the other countries. Table 2 shows that 
the migration rate of the primary educated (unskilled) is only 0.1%. The corresponding 
figures for other regions are: 2.3% (Northern Africa), 0.3% (Western Africa, Southern 
Africa), 0.2% (Eastern Africa), 2.8% (Western Asia) and 0.5% (South-Central Asia). 
Similarly, migration rate of the secondary educated (semi-skilled) is also low for Zambia 
at 0.3% relative to other African countries as shown in the table. Low emigration rates for 
the unskilled and semi-skilled coupled with moderate level for the skilled has skewed 
Zambia’s migration structure in favor of the highly educated. The following graphs 
illustrate the point. 








































































































































For Zambia the percentage of its 
tertiary educated citizens living 
abroad is moderate by African 
standards but much higher than 
many countries outside Africa.  
 
Overall emigration rates to the 
developed rich countries are 
lower in Africa relative to rest of 
the world. For Zambia these rates 
are low even by African 
standards.   9




















































































































































































































Migration of the unskilled: an opportunity for Zambia 
 
It is important to recognize that the main cause of Zambia’s skewed composition is not 
that too many of the skilled but that too few of the unskilled migrating. Clearly, 
facilitating the emigration of the unskilled to areas where they have better economic 
opportunities is desirable. What can Zambia do to achieve this given the highly restrictive 
immigration policies in richer countries?  
One reason for the aversion on the part of the receiving countries is their inability 
to keep this form of migration truly temporary. Guest worker schemes implemented in 
the past were intended to fill temporary shortages in host country’s labor markets. The 
attractiveness of these schemes to host countries lay primarily in their temporariness 
because unlike permanent migration, temporary migration is more flexible, imposes less 
burden on the pubic exchequer (like schooling for migrants’ children, old-age pension, 
etc.) and does not threaten the socio-cultural-political structure of the host country. 
However, the system based on guest worker schemes failed to develop into an efficient 
and dynamic migration regime precisely because it had no in built mechanism to ensure 
timely return of the migrants and temporariness remained a distant dream. That the issue 
of timely return is important to host countries is reflected in the new generation of 
bilateral agreements. For example, the agreement between Spain and Ecuador signed in 
2001 specifically requires that before seasonal workers are hired, they shall sign a 
commitment to return to Ecuador when their permit expires (Article 12). 
There are also examples of some success stories such as the Canadian Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Programme (SAWP). The program started in 1966 and has since 
evolved in size and geographic reach. For instance, over the last 20 years the intake 
increased from just under 6000 in 1980 to 18,700 in 2003. Another successful case is the 
“German contract worker scheme”. The German scheme is implemented through a series 
of bilateral agreements with Eastern and Central European countries and is perhaps one 
of the biggest in the world. A key element in both these success stories is the involvement   10
of sending countries with specific obligations and rights over matters related to the 
selection and screening of migrants, migrant’s rights in the host country, and above all, 
ensuring their return. For example, the German scheme delegates the responsibility of 
recruitment and timely return to the sending country. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the cost of ensuring temporariness is considerably reduced with the effective cooperation 
of source countries. In fact, the experience so far suggests that it is almost impossible to 
maintain temporariness without the involvement of the source countries. An important 
reason for this is that source countries have a natural advantage in the recruitment process 
and in facilitating timely return. Source countries have better information than host 
countries about migrants’ backgrounds for security purposes, their qualifications and 
training for better job matching, and local labor market conditions, all of which can help 
with recruitment. Repatriation of those caught living abroad illegally would be extremely 
costly without the source country’s cooperation as such migrants often destroy their 
passports and other legal documents making it difficult even to ascertain their nationality. 
Lastly, the source country’s involvement will also help to ensure that due consideration is 








Sending countries such as Zambia can play an important role in liberalizing the 
migration of the unskilled. However, it is important to realize that in order to do so they 
must shed their focus on somehow getting host countries to open their borders and 
instead provide a credible case of ensuring temporariness either on their own or in 
cooperation with the host countries. With low-cost temporary migration arrangements in 
place, demand may grow from labor-scarce richer countries.  
 
 
Zambia should take initiatives 
unilaterally and bilaterally with 
destination countries to keep 
migration of the unskilled truly 
temporary. Such brand-Zambia 
unskilled migration may create its 
own demand. 
 
Unskilled migration offers large 
social benefits to the sending 
countries which may dwarf those 
from migration of the skilled.   
But Zambia lags far behind other 
countries in this form of 





Box 1.  A model agreement for the migration of the unskilled 
 
 
A: Host country obligations 
1) Inform Zambia about the number of guest workers needed. 
2) Prepare the work contract before the migrant departs which specifies the duration of stay, 
wage rate, working hours and working conditions, other benefits and basic rights to which the 
migrant may be entitled. 
3) Facilitate the processing of contracts and obtaining visa. 
4) Give preference to those workers who returned on time in the past. 
5) Prohibit employers who violated contracts in the past from participating in the program.  
 
B: Source country obligations 
1) Set up an agency to which prospective migrants can submit their applications. 
2) Provide necessary help with the screening, selection, recruitment and pre-departure 
orientation of the migrants. 
3) Position a liaison officer in the receiving country to monitor the migrants and the fulfillment 
of the terms in the contract. 
4) Ensure the timely return of migrants through monitoring and variety of mechanisms such as 
withholding of a part of the migrant’s income till he returns, “bonding system” with punitive 
measures, reintegration programs such tax exemptions on return, provision of information on 
job vacancies, skill training, micro-credit schemes for housing and small business loans. Since 
some of these measures such as withholding income may be subject to abuse by the 
employers, the agreement should clearly specify which government agencies or third parties 
such as the IOM would implement them. 
 
C: Potential benefits from the agreement 
1) As the source country, Zambia has a natural advantage in the process of selection, 
recruitment and pre-departure orientation. Cost savings to employers and host countries 
through this channel have been an important factor in the success of previous efforts such as 
the German contract worker scheme. 
2) Ensuring timely return is costly to the host but this cost can be considerably reduced 
through the involvement of source by way of monitoring, provision of information and a 
streamlined system of repatriating the overstayers. 
3) Host offers safe, secure and stable employment opportunities which the source cannot 
achieve on its own. The host gets truly temporary migration which is safe, orderly and can be 






Box 2.  Past experience with managing temporary migration of the unskilled 
 
 
A number of initiatives have been taken at the unilateral and bilateral levels which incorporate 
elements of the model agreement listed above. The main strength of these initiatives is the degree 
of organization and control they offer: they provide effective instruments for monitoring the 
movement of workers, ensuring their safety and protection, and facilitating return. Some examples 
are as follows. 
  The Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the Overseas Workers 
Welfare Administration (OWWA) provide a number of services which facilitate orderly migration 
and enhance the gains from migration to all concerned. The agencies conduct intensified skills 
training and development training programs to improve the competitiveness of Filipino citizens. 
Foreign employers are able to recruit Filipino workers once their accreditation documents are 
verified by labor officers stationed abroad and authenticated by embassy officials. Employment 
contracts are scrutinized to ensure decent pay and working conditions. Return migration is 
facilitated through a number of reintegration schemes in place. These schemes cover both social 
and economic aspects, provide counseling to migrants and their families, skills training, 
educational assistance for children, micro-credit assistance and investment advice. 
  The Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) is a highly successful 
scheme and is often cited as model for similar agreements. The main reason behind this success is 
the fact that all parties concerned are assigned specific obligations and have a mutual interest in 
fulfilling these obligations. These parties include Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada (the federal employment and labor ministry), Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
Provincial governments, signatory foreign governments, employers and industry organizations 
(such as FARMS), the liaison officer stationed in Canada by the sending countries, IOM, etc. The 
local employment office is responsible for approving the offer of employment to foreign workers 
and transmitting the orders to other participating groups, obtaining the employer’s signature on the 
employment contracts and sending them to the liaison office. The liaison officer facilitates the 
recruitment of workers, audits pay, attends to problems on site, coordinates movement of workers 
with travel agencies, etc. Cooperation by employers, liaison officer and embassy officials greatly 
helps in the timely return of the migrants. 
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Migration of the skilled and brain drain 
 
The issue of brain drain has received extensive attention especially in the African context. 
From the source country’s point of view, brain drain is a problem because it deprives the 
poor sending countries of valuable skills, there is increased burden on the public 
exchequer since in many poor countries higher education is publicly funded, and critical 
shortages are beginning to emerge in key sectors such as healthcare and education.  
The seriousness of these concerns cannot be dismissed even for a country with a 
moderate level of brain drain such as Zambia. The reason for this is that even a moderate 
rate of brain drain can have a significant impact on the economy if the country is initially 
scarce in human resources, has limited capacity (educational infrastructure) to produce 
highly skilled professionals or if emigration is concentrated in key sectors such as 
healthcare and education. In fact, the rate of brain drain tends to be higher in African 
countries with a lower initial stock of professionals. The picture is similar when we 
include other countries (Appendix B).  
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Zambia has limited capacity to produce professionals and has a low initial stock of 
professionals even by African standards. We provide some evidence on this after briefly 
describing the nature of health skills drain from the country. 
Hard data on migrants by their profession is not easily available for many 
receiving countries. Existing work on Zambia is largely based on guestimates and 
anecdotal evidence which relate mainly to the health professionals. These data estimate 
the total number of Zambian doctors abroad at 300 or about 46% of those currently 
working in the country’s public sector (MoH, 2005). According to the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council of the United Kingdom, a total of 461 Zambian nurses were recruited 
between 1998-2003 which constitutes about 7.6% of those currently employed in   14
Zambia’s public sector and about 14% of Zambia’s annual flow of nursing graduates. The 
following graph shows Zambia’s position relative to other countries in the supply of 
nurses to the UK.. 
 
Nurses recruited in the  UK in 2001 :





























  Zambia is clearly amongst the main suppliers of nurses to the U.K. and there is a 
clear upward trend since the late 1990s. The total number of nurses in the UK from 
Zambia increased from 15 in 1998/99 to 135 by 2002/03 implying that Zambia’s share in 
total foreign nurses in the U.K. increased from 0.3% to 1.13%. Clearly, some corrective 
steps should be taken to ensure that the trend does not translate into a health crisis in 
Zambia. Anecdotal evidence on shortages of health professionals is also worrying. For 
example, a recent study by IOM (2005) noted that international migration of the health 
workers, mainly to Britain and the United States, has exacerbated staff shortages at major 
hospitals such as the Ndola Central Hospital. The hospital requires 567 nurses but there 
are only 133 staff left to provide nursing services. The Ndola School of Nursing, which 
should be staffed with 27 tutors, is left with only three causing a decline in nursing 
graduation rates. (Later in the section we take a closer look at the graduation rates of 
healthcare professionals in Zambia relative to other countries.) 
  We next provide evidence on Zambia’s performance in producing skilled 
professionals. We believe that this is important not just in itself but also for a better 
understanding of the likely impact of skilled migration. Table 3 shows Zambia’s 
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Zambia’s performance in generating human capital is mixed. In 1980 Zambia ranked 2
nd 
in the set of 28 African countries for which data is available and first in the set of 
countries included in Table 3 in terms of the average years of schooling per capita with 
the absolute value being 3.9. However, in terms of tertiary schooling per capita, in 1980 it 
ranked second from bottom within the SADC countries in the table and 4
th from bottom 
in the set of 28 African countries with the absolute value being .006. From Table 3 we 
can see that both these absolute values have increased significantly in 2000 but Zambia’s 
performance relative to other countries is mixed. It’s rank in the set of all African 
countries for overall schooling has slipped to 6
th in 2000 and 4
th within SADC countries. 
For tertiary education, the country’s rank has improved to 17
th within Africa (29 
countries) and to 5
th within SADC. The improvement in tertiary education 
notwithstanding, Zambia continues to be an average performer in the continent and 
within SADC. 
  A similar picture emerges when we look at the number of physicians in the 
country (Table 4), another indicator of skill availability. Currently there are .116 
physicians per 1000 population in Zambia which is 6
th lowest among the SADC countries 
in the table. Comparable figures stood at 1.6 (World in 1998), and 0.179 (least developed 
countries as per UN classification in 2004).  
 




























Botswana         24.0  6.279  4.762  1.416  0.100 
Congo, DR      47.7  3.03  2.374  0.619  0.038 
Lesotho          28.8  4.232  3.628  0.568  0.036 
Malawi           40.7  3.204  3.017  0.170  0.017 
Mozambique   63.8  1.105  0.983  0.117  0.005 
South Africa  22.1  6.138  4.590  1.353  0.195 
Swaziland        21.7  6.010  5.016  0.880  0.114 
Tanzania         42.8  2.705  2.515  0.161  0.029 
Zambia           17.3   5.457   4.296   1.113   0.047  
Zimbabwe       12.7  5.354  3.456  1.775  0.123 
Source: Barro and Lee.   16
 
 
  In terms of the educational infrastructure for healthcare, Zambia currently has 
only one medical school, three nursing schools, and three technical colleges graduating 
doctors, nurses, and laboratory technicians, and pharmacists respectively. In 2004, these 
schools produced only 49 doctors, 540 nurses, 20 pharmacists and 38 laboratory 
technicians which sum to 693 healthcare professionals. Data provided by the United 
Nations on the number of students graduating in healthcare & welfare per capita show 
that Zambia ranks 8
th from bottom in a sample of 101 countries in the world and same in 
the set of 27 African countries (see the next graph). These graduation rates are not only 
low by international standards but also inadequate to sustain acceptable standards of 
healthcare. For example, to meet the basic WHO recommendations on staff-population 
ratios (1:5000 for doctors and 1:700 for nurses) Zambia would require an additional 
1,654 doctors and 10,636 nurses which equal about 34 and 20 times the respective annual 




       Table 4: Physicians in Africa: 2004 
 
Physicians per 1000 
population 
Botswana         0.398 
Congo, DR           0.107 
Lesotho          0.049 
Malawi           0.022 
Mozambique       0.027 
South Africa  0.770 
Swaziland        0.158 
Tanzania         0.123 
Zambia           0.116  
Zimbabwe         0.161 
Source: WDI, World Bank. Figure for Lesotho is for 2003 and 2002 
for Tanzania. 
Zambia’s performance in 
generating skilled professionals has 
improved significantly over the last 
two decades. However, the country 
still remains an average performer 
by African standards and is not 
equipped to meet its own needs.   17





















































































































































































































What is the solution? 
 
The solution to the skill shortage and brain drain related problems in Zambia must go to 
the root of the problem. The main reason for the shortages in Zambia is the country’s low 
capacity to produce skilled professionals although migration of the skilled tends to 
aggravate the problem. We suggest two broad principles for the design of an optimal 
solution to the skill situation in the country.  
 
•  Increased investment in human capital 
The primary solution to the shortage lies in producing more skilled workers. Even 
in healthcare, emigration restrictions are unlikely to solve the problem though they may 
have some impact. For example, the estimated shortage of doctors to meet the WHO 
recommendations is about 1654 which is approximately 5.5 times the estimated number 
of Zambian doctors practicing abroad. As in most developing countries, higher education 
in Zambia depends critically on financial support from the government. Low incomes and 
credit constraints deter most students from seeking costly private education.  For 
example, a recent survey conducted by the Government to assess the state of primary 
education in the country revealed that the majority of children who did not attend primary 
school cited financial difficulty as the main reason.
2 Investment in education must not be 
undermined by the cap imposed on public expenditure. Current public spending on 
education by the Zambian government is low even by African standards. 
 
                                                 
2 Zambia DHS EdData Survey 2002, Education Data for Decision Making.   18
 
Zambia’s expenditure on education as a % of GDP is the lowest amongst the countries 
shown. For Sub-Saharan Africa, the corresponding figure stood at 3.4 while for the least 
developed countries at 2.9. In addition to the low spending on education, there are some 
concerns that resources may not be suitably distributed across various disciplines. The 
following graph illustrates the point. 





















  Table 5: Government Expenditure on 
  Education in 2000 for SADC countries 
  As % of GDP 
Angola  2.61 
Botswana         2.15 
Lesotho          10.11 
Malawi           4.14 
Mozambique       2.36 
South Africa  5.58 
Swaziland        6.2 
Tanzania         2.17 
Zambia           1.99 
Zimbabwe         4.70 
Source: WDI, World Bank,. Figure for Botswana is for 2001 and for 
Mozambique and Tanzania for 1999.    19
The graph shows that Zambia is not doing enough to generate more health care 
workers. As compared to only 3% of the students in health and welfare, the 
corresponding figure for most of the other countries is much higher. For example, the 
figure stood at 22% (Angola), 8% (Benin), 11% (Ethiopia), 9% (Kenya, Swaziland), 11% 
(Mongolia). For all the countries for which data is available, Zambia outperforms only 7 
countries: Tanzania, Poland, Uganda, Bangladesh, Samoa, Sierra Leone and Bangladesh 
(data available for 73 countries).  
  Building capacity for greater human capital generation is a long-term and costly 
process. Given the current cap on public expenditure in Zambia, donor countries can help 
through aid and loans which could be tied to investment in higher education for 




Migration of the skilled must also be managed properly based on the current 
shortages of professionals in Zambia and potential benefits offered by such migration. 
The question which arises is precisely what does proper management of migration of the 
skilled entail for Zambia?  
 
•  Emigration restrictions, retention, voluntary return 
A number of countries including Zambia have attempted a range of policies to 
stem excessive outward flows of the skilled and bring back those who have moved 
abroad. Direct restrictions on emigration have been rare in Zambia and elsewhere. The 
government of Zambia recently issued a National Employment and Labor Market Policy 
(NELMP) which specifically factors in migration. The stated objective of the policy is to 
attract skilled Zambians back home by facilitating their return (integration) and 
improving the conditions of employment. Zambia has also implemented a “bonding” 
system which requires that all Zambians who are awarded a publicly funded scholarship 
have to sign an agreement before leaving the country to return after the completion of 
their studies. International organizations such as the IOM have implemented programs to 
encourage return migration. Initially IOM launched the Return of Qualified African 
Nationals (RQAN) program which was a voluntary scheme that African nationals in 
Europe and the USA could benefit from if they wanted to return to the continent. Zambia 
was singled out as one of the target countries. The scheme has now been replaced by 
Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA), a partnership of the African Union, the 
African Development Bank and several sub-regional bodies such as ECOWAS, SADC 
Emigration restrictions are not a 
substitute for building capacity for 
human capital generation in 
Zambia. For example, the estimated 
shortage of doctors to meet the 
basic WHO recommendation is 5.5 
times the number of Zambian 
doctors practicing abroad.  
Zambia’s public expenditure on 
education in amongst the lowest 
in Africa. There are some 
concerns that even this meager 
expenditure is not properly 
distributed across various 
disciplines.  
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and EAC. MIDA aims to bring the skills of African migrants in Europe and North 
America to bear in development projects in Africa.
3 
  These schemes are commendable and they should be pursued in the future. 
However, there is some concern about their effectiveness. While there is no systematic 
evaluation of the efficacy of these polices, anecdotal evidence suggests that their success 
has been modest. We believe that the limited success could be due to the following two 
reasons. Firstly, where punitive measures have been used (eg., bonding scheme), they 
have been too modest to make any significant impact on permanent outflows of the 
brains. A recent study by the IOM noted that “the bonding system has never worked 
effectively in practice. A major problem is the lack of monitoring and the difficulty of 
enforcing the bonding agreement” (IOM, 2005, page 65). Secondly, permanent settlement 
abroad requires substantial sunk cost by the migrant which once made makes return 
migration more costly. Most of the schemes discussed above do little to prevent this from 
happening. They target those who are already settled abroad and seek to achieve a 
temporary rather than permanent return.  
 
•  Compensation  
One idea which has gained some ground in the recent past is that the receiving 
countries should compensate the sending countries for the cost incurred by the latter in 
training those who leave. The compensation could be monetary or take the form of 
training schools established by the host in the sending countries for the would-be 
migrants.  
So far such ideas have not found much application and negotiations between the UK 
and Zambia have floundered on the issue of compensation. Host countries are typically 
averse to compensations in any form. This is not too different from what we observe in 
other areas such as trade negotiations where cooperation typically takes the form of 
reciprocal reductions in trade barriers and monetary compensations are rarely observed. 
There are other problems too. Firstly, agreement on the right level of compensation can 
be complicated. For example, source countries incur costs not only in providing technical 
education but also primary and secondary education. Should the host compensate for 
these costs also? Secondly, in most developing countries there are strong externalities 
from education. The direct cost of training does not adequately reflect the opportunity 
cost of skilled emigration to the source. Simply, if there were no externalities then there 
would be no need to manage migration as selfish individual motives would be consistent 
with social welfare maximization. The problem is that these opportunity costs are hard to 
evaluate   Thirdly, a notable feature of skilled migration is that it is not only that the 
highly skilled leave but it is the best among them who leave. A fair compensation scheme 
would require transfer amounts linked to the innate abilities of those who migrate which 
is perhaps too complicated. Fourthly, much of the benefit from skilled immigration is 
appropriated by the employing firms in the host country. Compensation by the 
government (of the host country) implies a transfer of resources from the government 
                                                 
3 There are other ways in which migration can be made more development-friendly. Examples include 
facilitating remittance transfers, dealing with double-taxation, and increasing the portability of pension and 
health insurance schemes across countries. We do not address these issues here because it is not clear if 
there is a direct link between such measures and the composition of migration (skilled vs. unskilled and 
temporary vs. permanent) which is the main focus of the paper.   21
(taxpayers) to the firms. This has obvious distributional implications which may not be 
politically feasible. One solution could be to tax the employers for hiring immigrant 
workers. However, this is equivalent to a discriminatory tax on immigrant income which 
has little history of success. 
Establishing training schools which are funded by the host country government is 
another option. In principle, such measures can reduce some of the adverse effects of 
brain drain on the source country but they too have limitations. In fact, the problems 
mentioned in the previous paragraph with compensation schemes apply as much to 
training would-be migrants in the source country. For example, we may ask if the host 
should establish primary schools also since those who migrate embody primary education 
as well. Additionally, a drawback of relying on compensation and training schemes alone 
is that they promote permanent migration at least indirectly since they do not impose any 
requirement of temporariness. As we argue below, temporary migration can deliver 
additional benefits to source without significant cost to the host when compared to 
permanent migration. Thus, compensation cum training schemes are best seen as 
complimentary to a temporary migration regime. 
 
 Migration as a Supplement 
One possibility is that the opportunity to work abroad could be used to induce 
professionals to serve a minimum number of years in priority areas such as the public 
sector and underserved rural regions. The scheme can be easily implemented in 
collaboration with the host countries where emigration clearance would require evidence 
of service in certain priority sectors and regions so marked by the source country. The 
scheme is not too different from a tax on emigration since working in the priority sectors 
entails lower wages and/or poorer working conditions. Of course, this will not solve the 
problem of brain drain completely but ensure that the sending country gets at least 
something in return for losing the skilled and it also helps to channel resources 






•  Exchange programs 
Motivated by concerns on the part of source countries about brain drain, some host 
countries are actively promoting short term visits by professionals of developing 
Emigration restrictions, retention 
& voluntary return schemes, 
compensation through monetary 
transfers or establishment of 
training schools can help in 
reducing the adverse effects of 




But these are at best complimentary 
measures since they do not exploit 
the benefits to source from a truly 
temporary migration regime. 
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countries to gain valuable expertise and experience. One example of this is the recently 
concluded bilateral agreement between South Africa and the U.K. which provides 
healthcare professionals a chance to go on time-limited placements to the other country. 
The proposed benefits are expected to arise from better information sharing and expertise 
in areas such as public health, professional regulation, workforce planning, public-private 
partnerships and hospital twinning initiatives. The agreement is a two-way arrangement 
with specific obligations undertaken by both the countries. It was motivated in part by 
concerns of brain drain raised by South Africa resulting from Britain’s policy of active 
recruitment of health professionals in South Africa. 
The problem with exchange programs is that they are limited in scope and do not 
address the strong push-pull factors driving current migration. For example, the bilateral 
agreement between South Africa and the UK has no provision of ensuring return of those 
health care professionals who are not part of the exchange program. Further, it is unlikely 
that the push-pull factors which fuel migration will to any significant extent be diluted by 
the proposed exchange program. In other words, an effective strategy to combat brain 
drain must adequately factor in the demand-supply mechanics operating through the 
global labor market. This brings us to our proposed solution which seeks to address the 
major concerns and problems discussed above. 
 
•  Temporary migration 
We noted that many of the concerns raised by skilled migration in source 
countries could be reduced if the duration of migration were appropriate. In 
understanding the difference between temporary and permanent migration it is important 
to note that a mere rotation of migrants under a temporary scheme does not in itself create 
any extra benefits to either country as compared to permanent migration. If anything, the 
turnover costs are likely to be higher with constant rotation of workers. To fix ideas 
consider the case of Zambian doctors abroad. As opposed to the current situation where 
these doctors are permanently settled abroad, a temporary migration regime would 
involve all the doctors returning to Zambia and an equal number of new doctors 
(measured in efficiency units) leaving the country. If the efficiency units of doctors in 
Zambia and Zambian doctors abroad are unchanged the switch to temporary migration 
does not have a positive effect on the welfare of either county.  
The key condition for temporary migration to dominate permanent migration is 
that the benefit of turnover to the source country dominates the cost of turnover to the 
host country.  The former is likely to be high when remittances, as well as learning and 
learning spillovers, are larger under temporary migration compared to permanent 
migration even though the latter offers scope for cumulative learning and earnings. The 
cost of turnover to the host is likely to be low where immigrants acquire host-specific 
skills quickly and at little cost to the host.  
 
 
Source country: Impact of temporariness 
The first benefit to source from temporariness is a larger inflow of remittances.
 4 There is 
strong reason to believe, and some hard evidence, that the propensity to remit is higher 
                                                 
4 Table A2, Appendix A provides estimates of inward remittances to Zambia and some of the other 
countries.   23
when migrants are better connected through, for example, family members living in the 
source country. Permanent migrants are typically accompanied by their families and have 
much less incentive to maintain networks in the source country and hence they are likely 
to remit less. Grieco (2004) provides a useful overview of the relevant literature and 
concludes that temporary or circular as opposed to permanent and family reunification 
based migration is likely to enhance the propensity to remit.  
Empirical evidence on the issue comes from two related sources including the 
remittance-decay literature and other studies which use a migrants’ intention to return 
home as a proxy for temporariness.  Early work on remittance decay produced somewhat 
mixed results. Brown (1997) looked at the remittance behavior of Tongans and Samoan 
migrants in Sydney and found no evidence of remittance decay. Funkhouser (1995) also 
found very weak evidence of remittance decay. However, more recent work finds strong 
evidence of remittance decay. For instance, Brown and Connell (2004) use the same data 
as in Brown (1997) mentioned above but they split the migrants into two groups: nurses 
vs. the rest. They find strong evidence of remittance decay for the latter but not for the 
former. Amuedo-Dorantes et al (2005), Fairchild and Simpson (2006), among others, find 
strong evidence of remittance decay.  
  In the present context, the remittance decay literature suffers from an important 
shortcoming because it implicitly treats those who have been in the host country for a 
short period as temporary migrants, even if these migrants have no intention of returning.  
Our interest is in the difference in behavior of those who know that they are obliged to 
return from those whose move is more open-ended.  Two migrants with the same 
duration of stay may behave very differently depending on their intention to stay 
permanently or not in the host country. Galor and Stark (1990) developed an early 
theoretical model showing that the propensity to remit is higher when migrants face a 
positive probability (intention) of return. Merkel and Zimmerman (1995) used a vast 
dataset from West Germany to test this hypothesis. Controlling for 15 variables including 
the number of years spent in the host country, they find that the intended duration of stay 
had a negative and statistically significant effect on the level of remittances. Brown 
(1997) and Ahlburg and Brown (1998) reach a similar conclusion in their studies of 
Tongan and Samoan migrants in Australia. More recently, a supplementary questionnaire 
on international transfers was added to the Indian Readership Survey by Devesh Kapur 
and Mark Rozensweig specifically targeted at understanding the link between 
temporariness (intention to return) and remittances. Rozensweig (2005) summarizes the 
findings from this survey and notes that after controlling for a number of factors, the 
remittance level of intended to returnees was about 3 times the remittance level of those 
who had no intention to return. Glytsos (1997) contrasts the remitting behavior of Greek 
migrants to Germany (temporary) and Australia (permanent) and also between early 
Greek-German (temporary) to later one (permanent). He finds strong evidence that 
temporary migrants have a much higher propensity to remit than permanent ones. 
Further, since temporary migrants are likely to leave their spouse and dependents in the 
source country, their propensity to remit is likely to be higher than permanent ones on 
this count too. A number of studies confirm this possibility. For example, Amuedo-
Dorantes et al. look at the remitting behavior of Mexican immigrants in the U.S using 
data from Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) and find that having a spouse or   24
dependents in Mexico has a statistically significant and positive effect on the decision to 
remit or not.  
 
The second benefit of a temporary migration scheme is that it provides greater 
scope for learning related benefits. That is, migration serves to enhance the skills, know-
how, etc. of the migrant and temporary migration ensures that these enhancements are 
transferred to the source country.
5  The fact that migrants acquire crucial knowledge and 
expertise while abroad is confirmed in a number of studies dealing with immigrant 
assimilation. However this literature implicitly assumes that such expertise is “host 
country specific” and there is no evidence on its portability (or lack of it) to the source 
country. Papers which focus directly on return migrants do help to shed light on this 
point. For example, Barrett and O’Connell (2000) study the performance of return 
migrants in Ireland and conclude that the returning Irish males earn about 10-15 % more 
than those who never migrated. They control for a number of observables and (ability 
based) selection biases so that the observed earnings differential is primarily due to 
greater accumulation of human capital abroad. Taylor (1976) and Thomas-Hope (1999) 
report that Jamaican migrants return home with enhanced skills, experience and perhaps 
most importantly leadership qualities. There is a small but growing literature which 
shows that employment choices of return migrants are significantly different from that of 
the non-migrants in the source country. In particular, returnees have a higher probability 
of being self-employed and that this phenomenon partly reflects superior skills and know-
how acquired abroad. For example, McCormick and Wahba (2001) study the 
employment experience of returnees to Egypt. Controlling for a host of factors including 
education level, they find that the return migrants had a much higher probability of being 
self-employed and they attribute this phenomenon to savings and skills acquired by the 
migrants while abroad. A recent survey by the IOM of return migrants to Ghana and 
Ivory Coast also reports that many return migrants were keen to start their own business 
ventures as opposed to working for others so as to implement new ideas, managerial and 
technical know-how they had acquired abroad.  
There are also a number of studies which show that on their return migrants bring 
back valuable “social capital”. In one of the earlier studies, Saloutos (1956) argued that 
return migrants to Greece brought back new ideas on democracy, social behavior, liberal 
business practices, etc. Subsequent studies confirmed significant differences between 
natives and return migrants in Greece with respect to such ideas (Bernard and Comitas, 
1978).The importance of leadership and social capital should not be under emphasized as 
it is crucial in the transfer of financial and human capital from the rich to poor countries 
through return migration (Faist, 1997). Existing evidence tends to support this view. For 
example, the IOM survey in Ghana and Ivory Coast referred to above documents a 
number of returnees claiming to benefit from social capital, etc., acquired abroad. A 40 
year old Ghanaian who after returning from the U.S. launched a now-well established 
consulting firm stated that: “People have come back with different experiences and in 
                                                 
5 Temporariness of the skilled is not always a costless process and may even be undesirable (for global 
welfare) in some cases where (re)training cost is high, learning periods are long or the cumulative learning 
from continued stay in the host country may be very large. However, for many lower skilled, semi-skilled 
and some highly skilled professions, transfer of knowledge through temporary migration is likely to be an 
important benefit.   25
fact most of the returnees that I’m aware of have come back to set up their own business, 
and I think they have been relatively more successful setting up their businesses because 
… I think you have an advantage when you’re traveled and you’ve come back, you are 
willing to take more risk, you are willing to push what you are doing.”
6 
These benefits of enhanced skills and knowledge need not be restricted to those 
who migrate only. That is, return migrants can pass on at least some of this knowledge to 
other Zambian doctors which is an additional gain to the source country. Of course, such 
transfers can occur under permanent migration also but it requires elaborate schemes such 
as RQAN and goodwill of the migrants.  
The third reason why temporariness could be attractive for Zambia relates to its 
egalitarian nature. Permanent migration involves only 300 doctors earning higher wages 
abroad and permanently so. In contrast, under temporary migration, such benefits would 
be distributed over a much larger section of the population. From an individual migrants’ 
point of view, permanent migration is high-risk and high-return as very few get a chance 
to work abroad but those who do earn higher wages for the rest of their life. On the hand, 
temporary migration is low-risk and low-return since more people get a chance to work 
abroad but over shorter periods. If agents are risk averse, and could choose which type of 
migration should be allowed in general, then temporary migration may well be the 
preferred choice in a political equilibrium. 
  Two related questions which remain to be answered relate to the host country’s 
incentive structure and the feasibility of implementing a temporary migration regime. We 
discuss these two issues below. 
 
 
Host country incentive structure: Generosity vs. self-interest 
Evidence on host’s preference between temporary and permanent skilled 
migration seems to be mixed. On the one hand, there are concerns about permanent 
immigration and most international negotiations focus only on temporary migration. On 
the other hand many developed countries have created channels through the broader 
migration policy which allow temporary migrants to become permanent residents. The 
main concern of the host about permanent rather than temporary migration is that the 
former involves additional socio-cultural and economic costs of the type discussed for the 
unskilled permanent migrants above. Let SP denote this cost. That is, replacing one 
would-be permanent migrant by a temporary one increases host country’s social welfare 
by SP units. The main advantage of permanent migration is that it allows host country to 
extract some surplus from investing in the migrants’ skills. For example, in a two period 
game, a firm may like to invest in providing firm-specific training to a migrant in period 
1 which increases his efficiency in the next period. Consequently, the firm can extract 
part of the surplus in the second stage. Suppose the surplus so extracted equals E while 
the cost of training to the firm equals c. Of course, values of E, c, SP will vary across 
migrants depending on various characteristics with perhaps the skill content of the 
migrant (profession) being most important. The following graph illustrates the point. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Reported in Ammassari (2003), page 10.   26
 
 
The graph shows that SP decreases with the skill content of the migrant. One reason for 
this could be that the more skilled and educated are able to integrate more easily with the 
natives of the host country and impose less of a long-term fiscal burden. Similarly, 
training opportunities tend to rise with the skill level of the migrant suggesting that the 
surplus ex post (E) and ex ante (E-c) are higher the more skilled a migrant is. This gives 
us the two upward sloping curves. Clearly, viewed at the beginning of period 1, the host 
prefers permanent over temporary if and only if E-c>SP which is the region to the right of 
B. The opposite holds for migrants with skill level less than B and hence the host prefers 
them for a temporary period only. However, at the beginning of period 2, the cost of 
training is already sunk and therefore the benefit from retaining a trained migrant is E 
rather than E-c while the cost remains SP. Applying the same logic again, the host would 
like to retain all migrants will skill level to the right of A where the ex post benefit is 
higher than the cost of permanent migration and repatriate the remaining ones with skill 
level less than A.  
  The analysis above has the following implications about the feasibility of a 
temporary migration regime. For skill levels less than A, the host prefers temporary 
migration only and this is also the equilibrium outcome. Thus, temporariness is 
guaranteed here. For migrants with skill level higher than B we get that the host would 
ideally like to keep them permanently and this is also the equilibrium outcome. Thus, 
repatriation of these migrants would require an element of generosity on the part of the 
host country. For migrants with skill levels between AB the host would ideally like 
temporary migration since the overall benefit from keeping them permanently (E-c) is 
less than the associated cost (SP). However, such a policy is clearly time inconsistent: 
since ex post the benefit (E) is higher than the social cost, the host will be tempted to do 
retain them permanently. Private firms can foresee this temptation and indulge in 
privately beneficial but socially detrimental (to host) training of the migrants. Clearly, for 
these migrants there is a clear case of mutual benefit to both the countries in ensuring 
SP, E 
O  Skill level  A  B 
SP 
E - c 
E  SP   27
their temporariness. One way to do so is through a bilateral agreement between host and 








  Successful implementation of migration policies has always been a problem 
perhaps because of the sensitive nature of migration. However, the problem of ensuring 
timely return is probably less of an issue with the migration of the skilled. Most of skilled 
migration occurs through legal channels and skilled migrants are typically employed in 
the formal sector. Consequently, the cost of monitoring their timely return to host is less 
and the benefit from overstaying to migrants is also less due to reduced work 
opportunities in the formal sector. Of course, host countries’ involvement in ensuring 
temporariness is vital because there is very little that source countries can do on their own 
in this respect. An ex-ante commitment by host, perhaps through a bilateral agreement 
with the source country, to keep migration truly temporary is crucial. Such a commitment 
based migration regime provides a greater degree of certainty and clarity, it avoids the 
tendency for host to act opportunistically, ex post, to keep the immigrants permanently 
and it also promotes the self-selection of immigrants who are more disposed towards a 
temporary stay only. The resulting migratory flows would suffice to meet the labor 
shortages in the host countries, allow source countries and migrants to reap the benefits 
of migration and avoid the adverse effects of brain drain. While it does go against the 
individual migrants’ incentive to settle abroad permanently but the migrant community in 
the aggregate stands to gain since a much larger number of (rotating) workers get an 
opportunity to work abroad. A model bilateral agreement aimed to achieve these 
objectives follows. 
 
For certain skill levels host countries 
prefer temporary over permanent 
migration. However, they cannot 
implement such a policy on their own. 
The net outcome is too much permanent 
and too little temporary and overall 
migration. Source countries like Zambia 
can help build a credible regime ensuring 
temporariness in such cases. Source, host 
and the migrant community in the 





For skill levels above a 
critical threshold level, 
temporariness can be 
achieved only through the 











Box 3.  A model agreement for the migration of the skilled 
 
Host country obligations: 
1) Submit a list of vacancies to the source with details on required 
qualifications, duration of employment, working conditions, the rights of the 
migrants and a copy of the contract between the employer and the prospective 
migrant. 
2) Employers found in violation of the terms of the contract would be banned 
from taking part in the program in the future. 
3) Allow migrants while in the host country to enroll in training programs to 
enhance their skills. 
4) Extension of the initial duration of employment must involve the migrant 
spending at least 3 years in the source country from the termination date of the 
initial duration of the contract. 
5) Facilitate the temporary movement of Zambian professionals in those areas 
where on-the-job learning opportunities are high subject to available vacancies 
and labor market tests that may be in place. 
6) Visa overstayers would be barred from taking part in the program in the 
future. 
 
Source country obligations 
1) Establish an agency where prospective migrants could submit their 
applications. Maintain a database with all relevant information accessible to 
the employers in the host country. 
2) Disseminate information on qualifications required to work in the host 
country and other information to facilitate migratory flows in the future. 
3) Facilitate the process of screening applicants, recruitment, security 
clearance, pre-departure orientation, obtaining visa and other travel 
documents. 
4) For migrants currently working in the public sector: an ex-ante commitment 
to re-hire them on their return. 
 
Gains from cooperation 
1) Source country has a natural advantage in the screening and recruitment of 
migrants which lowers the cost of hiring to employers. 
2) A stable and secure source of skilled workers to the host. With heightened 
security concerns after 9/11, Zambia can play an important role in ensuring 
that the prospective migrants do not pose a security threat to the host. 
3) Difficult for migrants to overstay knowing that the host is committed not to 
renew their visa for upto 3 years. Human capital accumulated by the migrants 
during their stay is now transferred to the source country. 
4) Migrants are deprived of the opportunity to stay permanently but this is 
more than compensated by a much greater number of rotating migrants who 
get to spend time abroad.  In the aggregate, the migrant community is likely to  




Box  4.       Past  experience 
 
Zambia can draw some lessons from the past experience of countries with the migration of the 
skilled. Usually, cooperative agreements between source and host countries do specify 
temporariness of the initial employment opportunities but they do not guarantee against long-
term or permanent migration, as for example through extensions of the initial employment 
contract or an alternative employment offer. This is a key difference from our proposal. 
  Poland and Netherlands launched a joint pilot project titled “Polish Nurses in the 
Netherlands; Development of Competencies” for the recruitment of Polish nurses to work in 
Netherlands. The stated objective of the project is twofold: to make a contribution to the 
personnel shortages of the Dutch health institutions and to enhance the competence of Polish 
nurses. The project involves temporary migration of Polish nurses for a period of upto 2 years. 
Furthermore, proper preparation before departure (including language training) was required and 
the governments committed themselves to facilitate also the process of return and reintegration 
in the Polish labor market. A recent evaluation of the project by the IOM shows mixed results 
both in terms of return migration of the nurses to Poland and knowledge acquired while working 
in the Netherlands. 
  The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) in the U.K. is another example of 
beneficial skilled migration. SAWS permits non-EEA nationals enrolled in full-time university 
studies and aged between 18 and 25 to work in agriculture and horticulture in the United 
Kingdom. The annual quota for the scheme has been increasingly rapidly over the years with the 
figure at 25000 for 2003. The main sending countries under the program are Poland, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania with India and Ghana making some inroads of late. Currently there is no 
limit to the number of times young people can participate in the program as long as they return to 
their home country for a minimum of three months. Participants are allowed to work on farms 
and can earn on average a net income of GBP200 per week. The main attraction of such schemes 
to source countries like Zambia is that they provides an opportunity for Zambian students in 
agriculture to learn new technologies and methodologies in the U.K. and apply them to Zambia 
on their return (OECD, 2004). 
  South Africa and the U.K. signed a bilateral agreement in 2003 to facilitate exchange of 
information, advice and expertise in the area of healthcare. Currently, the agreement does not 
address the issue of the broader economic migration of healthcare workers from South Africa to 
the U.K. but it does promise an ex ante commitment by the two countries to keep the exchange 
of professionals truly temporary. It is noteworthy that the agreement was in part inspired by 
South Africa’s concern over the drain of health care skills to the U.K. Zambia could cooperate 
with other sending countries like South Africa to negotiate temporary migration agreements for 




Table A1: Net Immigration Figures* 
Country/Region Net  immigration 




in 2000 (in 
thousands) 
Net immigration in 
2000 (per 1000 
population) 
Burundi -8.5  -80  -12.9 
Comoros      
Djibouti -11.4  4  6.8 
Eritrea -22.5  2  0.6 
Ethiopía 3.5  -7  -0.1 
Kenya 1.7  -3  -0.1 
Madagascar -0.1  -1  .. 
Rwanda -58.4  395  62.8 
Seychelles -1.7  121  1.5 
Sudan -0.8  -77  -2.6 
Uganda 1.4  -14  -0.6 
DR of Congo  4.9  -340  -7.1 
Malawi -17.1  -9  -0.8 
Mauritius -3.1  -2  -2 
Zambia -0.1  14  1.4 
Zimbabwe -3.3  -3  -0.2 
Eastern Africa  -1.5  278  1.2 
Southern Africa  0.4  -13  -0.3 
North Africa  -1.3  -261  -1.6 
Africa -0.6  -447  -0.6 
Less Developed 
Regions 
-0.6 -2321  -0.5 
Source: International Migration Report 2002, UN. 
* Figures for 1990, 2000 represent averages for 1990-95, 1995-2000, respectively.  Figures for migration in 
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Zambia 20.7  2.13  0.66 
Ethiopia 53.0  0.84  0.82 
Madagascar 19.1  1.27  0.51 
Rwanda 13.6  1.82  0.7 
Seychelles 0.3  3.70  0.05 
Sudan 479.1  15.54  4.5 
Uganda 317.8  14.08  5.33 
Total (All countries above)  882.8 6.36  3.01 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2957.1 4.6  0.92 
Source: IMF, UN Wall Chart, GDF, 2003 and WDI. Per capita and % of GDP  
Figures are obtained by diving the total remittance figures with population and  
GDP figures for countries for the year 1999. 
 
The corresponding per capita remittance figures for some other countries stood at 
9.3 (India), 67 (Mexico), 80 (Philippines), 79 (Morocco), 32 (LAC region) and 10.3 
(World
7). As % of GDP, the corresponding figures in some other parts of the world are 
0.9% (LAC region), 2.1% (India), 7.9% (Philippines), 1.4% (Mexico), 6.3% (Morocco), 
4.1% (Mozambique) and 0.2% (World). Thus official inward remittances in Zambia are 
at best modest. 
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